

A large container ship is shown from a low angle, sailing on the ocean. The ship's hull is dark grey, and its upper decks are filled with stacks of colorful shipping containers in shades of green, blue, and red. The ship is moving towards the right, leaving a white wake in the dark blue water. The sky is a mix of orange, yellow, and blue, indicating a sunset or sunrise. In the distance, a low-lying coastline with some buildings and a few sailboats is visible.

Kubernetes Multi-Tenancy & User-Management

By Fabian Kramm

 @FabianKramm



Hi! I am Fabian.



- CTO @ DevSpace Technologies Inc.
- We help companies to provision secure Kubernetes sandbox environments
- Open-Source Contributor
- Prev. worked at SAP & sovanta AG
- Trivia: Born in Mannheim

 [@FabianKramm](https://twitter.com/FabianKramm)

What is Multi-Tenancy?



Source: platform9.com

 @FabianKramm

 **DevSpace**

Why Multi-Tenancy?

Separate Clusters vs. Cluster Sharing



- **Higher Compute Cost**

- Redundant cluster-wide resources (e.g. control planes, operators, storage and networking services)
- Less efficient cluster auto-scaling

- **Higher Maintenance Cost**

- Number of clusters explodes with adoption spreading across teams and applications
- Hard to keep everything in sync

Separate Clusters vs. Cluster Sharing



- **Lower Compute Cost**
 - Shared cluster-wide resources
 - Less efficient cluster auto-scaling
- **Lower Maintenance Cost**
 - Reduce number of clusters (sharing if it makes sense)

Hard Tenancy vs Soft Tenancy

- Hard Tenancy:

- No trust between tenants
 - Multiple users from multiple different places are sharing the cluster
- => Lots of configuration necessary

- Soft Tenancy:

- Tenants usually part of the same organization
 - *Small* chance of malicious behaviour
 - “prevent accidents” rather than assuming the worst
- => Rather easy to achieve

Overview

■ Basics

- Access Control
- Namespaces

■ Authentication

- OpenID Connect
- Service Accounts
- Rancher

■ Authorization

■ Admission Control

- Resource Quotas
- Limit Ranges
- PodSecurityPolicies
- Open Policy Agent


■ Advanced Isolation

- Network Policies
- Sandboxing Containers

Namespaces

- **Namespace = Scope for names of Kubernetes resources**
- **Some resources are cluster-wide** (Persistent Volume)
- **Cannot be nested** (yet?)
- **Reserved namespaces:**
 - kube-system (control plane)
 - kube-public (currently used for kubeadm)
 - default

Access Control in Kubernetes



Source: Kubernetes Documentation

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
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Where are we?



Source: Kubernetes Documentation

User Authentication

■ Several Methods

- Client Certificates (e.g. with flag `--client-ca-file=CA-FILE.pem`)
- HTTP Basic Auth (e.g. with flag `--basic-auth-file=USER-FILE.csv`)
- Bearer Tokens
 - using static token file (with flag `--token-auth-file=TOKEN-FILE.csv`)
 - using OIDC (OAuth2) => Dex project
 - using token verification via webhook
 - using service account tokens
- Authentication Proxy

⇒ **Requires Kubernetes api server access**

```
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJrdWJlcm5ldGVzL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9uYW1lc3BhY2UiOiJjYyIsImt1YmVybmV0ZXMuaW8vc2VydmljZWFjY291bnQvc2VjcmV0Lm5hbWUiOiJkZWZhdWx0LXRva2VuLTJoa2ZkIiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9zZXJ2aWNlLWFjY291bnQubmFtZSI6ImRlZmF1bHQiLCJrdWJlcm5ldGVzLm1vL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50L3NlcnZpY2UtYWNjb3VudC51aWQiOiI2MGQyMTg2MS0wNjQwLTEuZWVhZG91ZC0wMjUwMDAwMDAwdEiLCJzdWIiOiJzeXN0ZW06c2VydmljZWFjY291bnQ6Y2M6ZGVmYXVsdCJ9.rDmdpTKruM1KRB3Y3ygxS0-7SMBzQ08wQBAsWJ7-K4mTyekUKBvyLvK0qfkUdHwAljntk_CeuMfcBnC6Aed1j8PHwYBr8MJWpL376V2FEQPB90YJWYcH98bWAL_kw_QHuaERU8inc0R9cqvg5jjef-won6VpsLWnUeOLfhQo7sNm_VIcunnUH0k6VUeR3aEtxx7yPuGP2DT_a0eeUGBGAc94QWdQxssu38pxhY5Pe8nyaH28e2kHcE0fTck0z82nHBseJDwEmfWTMX
```

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
{
  "alg": "RS256",
  "kid": ""
}
```

PAYLOAD: DATA

```
{
  "iss": "kubernetes/serviceaccount",
  "kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace": "cc",
  "kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/secret.name": "default-token-2hkfd",
  "kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/service-account.name": "default",
  "kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/service-account.uid": "60d21861-0640-11ea-8f5d-025000000001",
  "sub": "system:serviceaccount:cc:default"
}
```


VERIFY SIGNATURE

```
RSASHA256(
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
```

Public Key or Certificate. Ent

OpenID Connect

Source: Kubernetes Documentation



ServiceAccounts

- Usually used by in cluster services
- Kubernetes auto-generates ServiceAccount “default”
- Every container mounts a volume with the token of the ServiceAccount referenced by the container’s pod (can be disabled)


/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount

- **Only Kubernetes managed account resource**
(Kubernetes does not know a user resource)

```
1  apiVersion: v1
2  kind: Config
3  clusters:
4  |  - cluster:
5  |    |  certificate-authority-data: LS0tLS1CRUdJT...
6  |    |  server: https://kubernetes.docker.internal:6443
7  |    |  name: docker
8  contexts:
9  |  - context:
10 |    |  cluster: docker
11 |    |  user: docker
12 |    |  name: docker
13 current-context: docker
14 users:
15 |  - name: docker
16 |    |  user:
17 |    |  token: eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJrdWJlcm5ldGVzL3Nlcn
```

Rancher Authentication Proxy

- Rancher forwards user requests to Kubernetes using a service account and impersonation
- Supports local or external authentication (e.g. github, ldap etc.)
- Users can access multiple clusters with one single set of credentials



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
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Where are we?



Source: Kubernetes Documentation

RBAC (Role-based access control)

- Stable since Kubernetes 1.8

- **Successor of ABAC**

(using kubectl, via Kubernetes resources)

```
1  apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
2  kind: Role # Namespace scoped
3  metadata:
4    namespace: default
5    name: pod-reader
6  rules:
7    - apiGroups: [""] # "" indicates the core API group
8      resources: ["pods"]
9      verbs: ["get", "watch", "list"]
```

- **Roles define what type of access is allowed on resources**

- Roles for namespace scoped authorization
- ClusterRoles for cluster scoped authorization

RBAC – RoleBindings

- Role bindings assign Users / Groups / ServiceAccounts to roles
 - ClusterRoleBinding binds ClusterRoles
 - RoleBinding binds ClusterRoles / Roles
- Multiple subjects per binding possible

```
1  apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
2  # This role binding allows "fabian" to
3  # read pods in the "default" namespace.
4  kind: RoleBinding
5  metadata:
6    name: read-pods
7    namespace: default
8  subjects:
9  - kind: User
10    name: fabian
11    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
12  roleRef:
13    # Role or ClusterRole
14    kind: Role
15    # this must match the name of the Role
16    # or ClusterRole you wish to bind to
17    name: pod-reader
18    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
```

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
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


Source: Kubernetes Documentation

Admission Controllers

- Intercept requests to the API server
- **Types:**
 - Mutating – Change the resources sent within the request (called first)
 - Validating – Allow or deny the resources sent within the request
- **30+ prebuilt admission controllers available**
- MutatingAdmissionWebhook **and** ValidatingAdmissionWebhook **allow to add dynamic admission control via webhooks**

Admission Controllers



Source: Kubernetes Blog

ResourceQuota

- Enforced as admission controller
- Limits aggregate resource consumption per namespace
- Common cases:
 - Limit total cpu/memory requests/limits
 - Limit total persistent storage or ephemeral storage
 - Limit total number of pods/services/secrets/configmaps/...
 - Limit total number of resource quotas ;-)

```
1  apiVersion: v1
2  kind: ResourceQuota
3  metadata:
4    name: quota
5    namespace: myspace
6  spec:
7    hard:
8      count/roles.rbac.authorization.k8s.io: "5"
9      pods: "100"
10     requests.cpu: "8"
11     limits.cpu: "16"
```

LimitRange

- Allows to set min | max | default values for cpu | memory | storage
- Prevents that a single pod/container consumes all available resources in a namespace (Resource Quota)
- Also available for persistent volume claims

```
1  apiVersion: v1
2  kind: LimitRange
3  metadata:
4    name: mylimitrange
5    namespace: myspace
6  spec:
7    # Limits the container
8    # resources to 1-4 cores
9    limits:
10     - max:
11         cpu: "4"
12       min:
13         cpu: "1"
14       type: Container
```

```
1  apiVersion: v1
2  kind: Pod
3  metadata:
4    name: nginx
5    labels:
6      name: nginx
7  spec:
8    containers:
9      - name: nginx
10        image: nginx
11        ports:
12          - containerPort: 80
13        resources:
14          requests:
15            cpu: "0"
16            memory: "0"
17          limits:
18            cpu: "0"
19            memory: "0"
```

```
1  apiVersion: v1
2  kind: Pod
3  metadata:
4    name: nginx
5    labels:
6      name: nginx
7  spec:
8    containers:
9      - name: nginx
10        image: nginx
11        ports:
12          - containerPort: 80
13        volumeMounts:
14          - mountPath: /mnt
15            name: bad-volume
16    volumes:
17      - name: bad-volume
18        hostPath:
19          path: /
```


PodSecurityPolicy

- Allows admins to limit the capabilities of pods
- Once enabled no pods can be deployed without active policy
- Common cases:
 - Disable privileged containers
 - Disable use of hostNetwork
 - Disable certain volume types (e.g. hostPath)
 - Restrict use of Linux capabilities (e.g. CAP_CHOWN)
- Assignable to roles

```
1  apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
2  kind: PodSecurityPolicy
3  metadata:
4    name: policy
5  spec:
6    allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
7    fsGroup:
8      rule: RunAsAny
9    hostPorts:
10     - max: 0
11       min: 0
12    runAsUser:
13      rule: RunAsAny
14    seLinux:
15      rule: RunAsAny
16    supplementalGroups:
17      rule: RunAsAny
18    volumes:
19     - persistentVolumeClaim
```

Open Policy Agent (OPA)

- Dynamic admission controller
- Language for policy logic: Rego
- Allows to define admission rules as Kubernetes resources
- Audits
- Gatekeeper project adds custom resource definitions for policies



Source: OPA Documentation

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NetworkPolicy

- Restricts the incoming (ingress) and outgoing (egress) network traffic of pods
- Pods initially allow all ingress and egress traffic if they are not selected by a network policy
- Must be supported by the underlying network plugin!

```
1  apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
2  kind: NetworkPolicy
3  metadata:
4    name: networkpolicy
5    namespace: myspace
6  spec:
7    egress:
8      - to:
9        - podSelector: {}
10       - namespaceSelector:
11         matchLabels:
12           my.cloud.com/traffic-allowed: allowed
13     podSelector: {}
14     policyTypes:
15       - Egress
```

Sandboxing Containers


■ Containers != VMs

- Sharing a kernel bears risks
- Vulnerabilities can lead to programs escaping the “soft” boundaries of a container

■ Sandboxing Methods

- Container Runtimes for Isolation
 - [gVisor](#) (user-space kernel)
 - [Katacontainers](#) (lightweight vm)
- Nodeless Kubernetes
 - [Virtual Kubelet](#)
 - [Elotl](#)

How are we using all of these features in DevSpace Cloud?



I'm here to help. Get in touch.



- Connect on Twitter: [@FabianKramm](https://twitter.com/FabianKramm) 
- Email me: fk@devspace.cloud
- Check out our projects on GitHub:



Get the fastest development workflow for Kubernetes



Turn any Kubernetes cluster into a powerful development platform

